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1 Introduction 
 
In promulgating a new Constitution on 27 August 2010, Kenya ushered in a new and 
progressive constitutional dispensation aimed at enhancing substantive equality, 
democracy, good governance and the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. This is encompassed in the preamble of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
(the Constitution), which expresses the commitment of the Kenyan people to 
nurturing and protecting the well-being of all, as well as to recognising the 
aspirations of Kenyans to be governed by the values of human rights, equality, 
freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law.1 The Constitution can be 
termed a transformative constitution2 as it is aimed at effecting a restructuring of 
the Kenyan State and society to ensure the egalitarian redistribution of power and 
resources through the eradication of systemic forms of domination and material 
disadvantage.3 In order to achieve its transformative aspirations, the 2010 
Constitution has espoused a positive State duty to combat poverty and inequality as 
                                                 
  Nicholas Wasonga Orago. LLB (Hons), University of Nairobi; LLM (Cum Laude), University of 
Pretoria; LLD, University of the Western Cape. Email: nicholasorago@gmail.com. The author is a 
researcher at the Socio-economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of the 
Western Cape. The kind financial support of the University of the Western Cape Research 
Department is acknowledged. 
1  The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 paras 5-6 of the Preamble. See also a 10 of the 2010 
Constitution which enumerates the national values and principles of governance which include: 
human dignity, equity, social justice, human rights and the protection of the marginalised; good 
governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; as well as sustainable development. 
2  For an elaboration of the concept of transformative constitutionalism, see generally Klare 1998 
SAJHR 146-188. 
3  For an understanding of the transformation intended to be achieved by a transformative 
constitution in the context of the 1996 South African Constitution, see Liebenberg, Socio-
economic Rights Adjudication 25; Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 249. 
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well as to promote social welfare,4 has adopted a substantive (redistributive) 
concept of equality,5 and has entrenched justiciable socio-economic rights (SERs). 
The entrenchment of these SERs in the Constitution engender the obligation on all 
organs of the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil them so as to improve the 
living standards of the Kenyan people.6 An understanding of the nature, scope and 
extent of these obligations arising from the entrenched SERs is imperative for the 
government, the courts and the Kenyan society at large if the entrenched rights are 
to achieve their transformative potential. The rights are, however, not absolute and 
can be subjected to legitimate limitation in accordance with the law. As integral 
components of human rights law, SERs are similarly subject to legitimate limitation 
by the State. Therefore an understanding of SER obligations is incomplete without 
the undertaking of an analysis of the limitations, as they impact directly on the 
extent of the obligations that accrue to the State. The importance of a limitations 
analysis in the elaboration of entrenched constitutional rights is affirmed by Roza 
Pati, who contends that the ascertainment of the legal effect of a right by defining 
only its substantive scope is incomplete until a limitations analysis is undertaken, due 
to the need to balance societal needs against individual interests.7 The International 
Council of Human Rights Policy has also affirmed the importance of a limitations 
analysis, especially in instances where resources are constrained and capacities are 
inadequate, which is the prevailing situation in Kenya.8 
 
The purpose of this article is to propose an approach, based on international and 
comparative law,9 to guide the Kenyan courts in interpreting and limiting the 
entrenched SERs in the context of adjudication to enhance the achievement of the 
                                                 
4  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, Preamble para 5 and a 10. 
5  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, aa 10, 19(2), 20(4), 27 and 45(3). 
6  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, a 21. The duty to fulfil its obligations in the realisation of human 
rights is further entrenched by the constitutional requirement that the State enact legislation 
aimed at fulfilling obligations under international law. See the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, a 21(4). 
7  Pati 2005 Berkeley J Int'l L 324-325. See also Mutakha-Kangu 2008 LSKJ 1, who argues that 
effective protection of human rights at the national level is dependent on the design of the 
limitation clause. 
8  ICHRP 2003.ichrp.org 15. 
9  The article relies heavily on comparative jurisprudence from South Africa on the basis of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, having strongly influenced Kenya's 
constitutional drafting team.  Existing South African SER jurisprudence makes for a useful guide 
for the Kenyan courts, generally.   
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transformative potential of the Constitution. In this context, the article proposes that 
the Kenyan courts should adopt a proportionality approach in their limitations 
analysis in the adjudication of SER disputes. According to Brand, a proportionality 
approach envisages the courts weighing "the purpose and benefits of the 
infringement against its nature, effect and severity, and considers the relative 
efficacy of the infringing measure in achieving its purpose, to decide whether or not 
it is justified".10 To enhance the practical application of this approach, the article 
proposes that Kenyan courts adopt a three-stage constitutional analysis method for 
the adjudication of SER disputes instead of the traditional two-stage constitutional 
analysis method adopted for the constitutional adjudication of civil and political 
rights (CPRs). This approach envisages the analysis of the nature, scope and content 
of the entrenched SERs and a determination of their violation or denial in a specific 
case at the first stage; an analysis of their delimitation by the internal qualifiers 
engendered in the adoption of the standard of progressive realisation for the 
fulfilment of most of the entrenched SERs at the intermediate (second) stage; and 
the undertaking of a proportionality test using the general limitation clause 
entrenched in article 24 of the Constitution at the third stage. This proposal is based 
on the reasoning that if the transformative aspirations of the Constitution are to be 
realised and for the entrenched SERs to have a substantive positive impact on the 
lives of the Kenyan people, any measure by the government aimed at their limitation 
must be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts, a form of scrutiny that can be 
achieved only by using the proportionality standard entrenched in the article 24 
general limitation clause. 
 
In order to achieve the above objective, the article is divided into four sections. The 
section to follow undertakes an analysis of the nature and scope of the SERs in the 
Constitution and the nature and scope of the obligations arising from these rights. 
Such an analysis of necessity entails a discussion of the internal limitations of SERs, 
especially those contained in article 43 of the Constitution. Section three of the 
article entails an analysis of the general limitation clause in comparative context and 
it proposes the adoption of a proportionality test by the courts in SERs adjudication. 
                                                 
10  Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 102. 
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It delves into an analysis of SERs limitations jurisprudence at the international level, 
at the regional level, and in South Africa, as a comparable foreign jurisdiction. From 
the comparative analysis, generally, it proposes the adoption of the proportionality 
test in the Kenyan context. Section four concludes this article. 
 
2  Understanding the nature, scope and content of the socio-economic 
rights in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution  
 
2.1  The nature of the socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
 
Kenya has, for the first time in the country's history, entrenched SERs as part of a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights encompassed in a bold Constitution, with the objective 
of inducing the egalitarian transformation of the Kenyan society.11 The main 
provisions on SERs in the Constitution are contained in article 21(2), which espouses 
the standard of progressive realisation,12 article 43, which encompasses the rights to 
health, housing, food, water, social security and education,13 and article 53(1), 
which provides for children's rights to free and compulsory education as well as basic 
nutrition, shelter and healthcare. The importance of work in the realisation of 
improved standards of living, and thus the transformation of the socio-economic 
conditions of individuals and families, is also acknowledged by the Constitution in its 
espousal of an array of labour relation rights such as the rights to fair labour 
                                                 
11  Article 19 earmarks the Bill of Rights as an integral part of Kenya's democratic state and the 
framework for all social, economic, and cultural policies. It further states that the objective of the 
entrenchment of rights in the Constitution is the preservation of the dignity of individuals and 
communities as well as the promotion of human rights and the realisation of the potential of all 
human beings. 
12  Article 21 deals with the implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms and sub-article 2 
requires the State to "take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting of 
standards, to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights guaranteed under article 43". 
13  Article 43 is entitled "Economic and social rights" and it provides in a 43(1) that "Every person 
has the right – (a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to 
healthcare services, including reproductive health; (b) to accessible and adequate housing, and 
to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of 
acceptable quality; (d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; (e) to social security; and, 
(f) to education". A 43(2) prohibits the denial of emergency medical treatment; and a 43(3) 
requires the State to provide social security to persons who are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants. 
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practices, fair remuneration, fair working conditions, the formation of and 
participation in trade unions, and the right to strike.14 
 
These constitutionally entrenched SERs are complemented and buttressed by the 
constitutional incorporation of SERs in international and regional legal instruments 
through article 2(6), which provides that "[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution".15 The direct 
incorporation of international human rights law into the Kenyan domestic legal 
system via article 2(6) has been affirmed by the Kenyan courts in several 
judgments,16 including in the Supreme Court, where the Chief Justice, in a 
Dissenting Opinion, held that "CEDAW applies through the operation of article 2(6) 
of the Constitution of Kenya, having been acceded to by Kenya on 9th March 
1984".17 Some of these international legal instruments providing for SERs that have 
been ratified by Kenya include: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),18 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),19 the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),20 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD),21 
                                                 
14  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, a 41. 
15  A complete analysis of a 2(6) is beyond the scope of this current article. The author has dealt 
with this issue elsewhere: see Orago 2013a AHRLJ (forthcoming). 
16  John Kabui Mwai v Kenya National Examination Council High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 
No 15 of 2011 6 ("Under article 2(6) of the Constitution the Convention forms part of our laws'"); 
Okwanda v The Minister of Health and Medical Services High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 
No 94 of 2012 para 12 ("Apart from Constitutional provisions governing economic and social 
rights, Article 2(6) provides that treaties and conventions ratified by Kenya shall form part of the 
law of Kenya"); Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General High Court of Kenya at Nairobi 
Petition No 164 of 2011 15 ("Article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution make the general rules of 
international law and any treaty or convention that Kenya has ratified part of the law of Kenya. 
Consequently, the state, state organs and all persons, in carrying out evictions, should do so in 
accordance with the United Nations Guidelines on Evictions"). 
17  In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate 
Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application 2 of 2012, Dissenting Advisory Opinion of 
Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, para 11.1. 
18  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR). Assented to by 
Kenya on 1 May 1972. 
19  Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC). Ratified by Kenya on 30 July 1990,  
20  Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) (CEDAW). 
Assented to by Kenya on 9 March 1984. 
21  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (UNCRPD). Signed by Kenya on 30 
March 2007 and ratified on 19 May 2008. 
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the relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions,22 the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights23 and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in 
Africa,24 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.25 These 
international legal instruments form an important source of SER norms for Kenyan 
courts. They also serve as an important guide in the interpretation and application of 
the SERs entrenched in the Constitution, as was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Kenya in its Gender Rule Advisory Opinion.26 This article thus draws inspiration from 
international law on the interpretation and application of the limitations provisions of 
the Constitution in SER adjudication. 
 
The Constitution deems SERs as justiciable. According to Viljoen, justiciability entails 
three related factors: first, the nature of the claim - meaning that the claim must be 
based on the infringement of a clear, subjective right; secondly, the setting within 
which the claim can be resolved - meaning that the claim must be resolved by a 
judicial body or a body with judicial characteristics; and, thirdly, the consequences of 
a successful invocation of the claim by a petitioner - meaning that should the judicial 
body positively determine a violation of the subjective right in question, it must 
remedy the violation.27 These criteria of the justiciability of SERs are met by the 
2010 Kenyan Constitution, which encompasses these rights as an integral part of the 
Bill of Rights, providing standing to a wide array of parties to access the courts in 
instances of the violation, infringement, denial or the threatened infringement of 
these rights.28 Justiciability is further affirmed by article 23 as read with article 165 
of the Constitution, which gives jurisdiction to the High Court to hear and determine 
                                                 
22  Kenya has ratified 49 ILO Conventions, 43 of which are in force and 6 of which have been 
denounced. Some of the Conventions in force include: the Forced Labour Convention (1930) (No 
29); the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949) (No 98); Equal 
Remuneration Convention (1951) (No 100); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957) (No 
105); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958) (No 111); Minimum Age 
Convention (1973) (No 138); and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999) (No 182). For 
the full ratification information, ILO Date Unknown www.ilo.org. 
23  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). Ratified by Kenya on 23 January 1992. 
24  Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003). Ratified by Kenya on 6 October 2010. 
25  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). Ratified by Kenya on 25 July 
2000. 
26  In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate 
Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application 2 of 2012 para 52. 
27  Viljoen "Justiciability of Socio-economic and Cultural Rights" 55. 
28  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, a 22. 
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applications for the violation of rights and to redress such violations through the 
adoption of effective remedies. 
 
The justiciability of similarly worded SERs in the South African Constitution was 
affirmed by the South African Constitutional Court (SACC) in the First Certification 
Judgement where the Court held that SERs could, at a minimum, be negatively 
protected from improper invasion.29 The justiciability of the entrenched SERs has 
also been affirmed by the Kenyan Courts in several cases.30 
 
2.2  The nature and scope of the obligations accompanying the socio-
economic rights 
 
When a State entrenches human rights in the Bill of Rights of its Constitution, it 
assumes a continuum of negative and positive obligations for the realisation of those 
rights. This continuum of obligations applies to both CPRs and SERs, as was 
acknowledged by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the case 
of SERAC and Another v Nigeria:31 
 
Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human 
rights indicate that all rights-both [CPRs] and [SERs]-generate at least four levels of 
duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations universally apply 
to all rights and entail a combination of negative and positive duties. 
 
The obligation to respect requires the state to refrain from interfering with the rights 
and freedoms of right-holders, and to respect their free use of resources, individually 
or in community with others, in the realisation of their rights.32 The obligation to 
protect entails the State's putting in place a legislative framework and other 
measures aimed at creating a conducive atmosphere for the protection of right-
                                                 
29  Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (First Certification case) 1996 
1 BCLR 1253 (CC) para 78. 
30  See Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Petition No 164 
of 2011 20-21; and Ibrahim Songor Osman v Attorney General High Court Constitutional Petition 
No 2 of 2011 7, among others. 
31  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria 2001 AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) 
(SERAC case) para 44. 
32  SERAC case para 45. 
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holders from violation of their SERs by third parties, and the provision of effective 
remedies should such violation by third parties occur.33 This is a positive obligation 
requiring the State to protect right-holders from political, economic and social 
interference. The obligation to promote requires the State to put in place measures 
aimed at the promotion of tolerance, raising awareness, and the building of 
infrastructure to enhance the enjoyment of human rights.34 The obligation to 
promote human rights, especially SERs, is closely linked with article 25 of the African 
Charter, which engenders the duty of the state to promote and ensure, through 
teaching, education and publication, that Charter rights as well as its obligations are 
understood by everybody within its national jurisdiction. The obligation to fulfil is a 
positive one requiring the State to move its machinery towards the actual realisation 
of SERs either through the creation of a conducive and enabling atmosphere to allow 
individuals to realise their own SERs or the provision of basic needs such as food or 
social security resources to those who, due to circumstances beyond their powers, 
are unable to provide for themselves.35 
 
In the Kenyan context these obligations are contained in article 21 of the 
Constitution, which provides that "[i]t is a fundamental duty of the State and every 
State organ to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights".36 Due to the similarities in the wording 
of the obligations, the Kenyan courts should seek guidance from international, 
regional and comparative foreign national jurisprudence in the interpretation of 
these obligations.37 
 
 
                                                 
33  SERAC case para 46. The duty to provide effective remedies is closely linked with the duty of 
States as provided in a 26 of the Charter which provides for the duty of the State to guarantee 
the independence of the courts and ensure the establishment and improvement of other 
appropriate national institutions entrusted with the protection and promotion of Charter rights. 
34  SERAC case para 46. 
35  SERAC case para 47. 
36  The Constitution, a 21(1). For an elaboration of the content of these obligations in relation to the 
SERs in the Kenyan Constitution, see Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi Petition No 164 of 2011 22- 23.  
37  For an elaboration of these obligations at the international level using the tripartite typology, see 
Eide Date Unknown www.fao.org; Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 184, 195-96; Craven 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 330ff, among others. 
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2.3  Internal limitation of the State's socio-economic rights obligations 
 
The scope of Kenya's SER obligations is, however, not absolute, and can be limited 
by the State either through internal limitations, as is the case with the SERs 
contained in article 43 of the Constitution, or by the article 24 external limitation 
clause, for those SERs not subject to internal limitations.38 This entails the 
acknowledgment that not all aspects of SERs can be immediately and completely 
realised in practice.39 The reasoning behind this internal limitation is, therefore, to 
enhance the overall legitimacy of the entire constitutional project, because, as has 
been argued in the South African context, the unequivocal and unconditional 
inclusion of rights in a constitution which cannot practically be entirely realised due 
to resource constraints will have a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the 
Constitution in general and the Bill of Rights in particular.40 The adoption of the 
standard of progressive realisation, therefore, retains the legitimacy of the 
entrenched SERs while giving the State the requisite margin of appreciation to put in 
place measures aimed at the full realisation of these SERs over time. 
 
In relation to the SERs contained in article 43, their scope is internally limited by the 
adoption of the standard of progressive realisation, requiring the State to take 
legislative, policy and other measures for the progressive realisation of those 
rights.41 The standard of progressive realisation in the Constitution has been 
adopted from article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which provides as follows:42 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
                                                 
38  The limitation of SERs under a 24 of the Constitution is discussed more elaborately in section 3 
below. 
39  See De Vos 1997 SAJHR 93. 
40  Heyns and Brand 1998 LDD 154-155. 
41  The Constitution, a 21(2). 
42  ICESCR a 2(1). 
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The standard has similarly been adopted in other international human rights 
instruments providing for SERs43 as well as in national constitutions that entrench 
justiciable SERs.44 Therefore, a proper understanding of the standard and how it 
internally limits SERs necessitates a comparative analysis of international and foreign 
national jurisprudence. 
 
2.3.1 Progressive realisation 
 
The standard of progressive realisation was adopted as a flexibility device which 
acknowledges that the full realisation of SERs cannot be achieved in a short period 
of time due to the realities of the world and the difficulties, in terms of human and 
financial resources, faced by most developing countries.45 The flexibility does not, 
however, mean that States should be lethargic or unduly delay the realisation of 
SERs at the national level. The CESCR, in interpreting the standard of progressive 
realisation, has affirmed that States must move as expeditiously, and as effectively, 
as possible towards meeting their goal of the full realisation of SERs, the raison 
d'être of the Covenant.46 This need for the effective and expeditious realisation of 
SERs has been affirmed internationally47 as well as nationally by SACC in the 
Grootboom case.48 
 
Even though the Covenant adopts the "progressive realisation" standard, it also 
contains immediate obligations.49 They are as follows: non-discrimination;50 an 
                                                 
43  Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) a 4; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UNCRPD) a 4 
44  The 1996 South African Constitution, ss 25(5), 26 and 27. See Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom) para 45, where the South African 
Constitutional Court adopted, in the South African context, the meaning of the standard of 
progressive realisation as developed internationally by the CESCR. 
45  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) paras 1, 9; Sepulveda Nature of Obligations 312. For an 
elaboration of 'progressive realisation' in the Kenyan context, see the In the Matter of the 
Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate Supreme Court of 
Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application 2 of 2012 paras 27-59. 
46  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) para 9. 
47  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) (Maastricht 
Guidelines) guideline 8; Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1987) (Limburg Principles) principle 21. 
48  Grootboom para. 45. 
49  See CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) para 1; CESCR General Comment No 4 (1991), para 
8; CESCR General Comment No 9 (1998) para 10; CESCR General Comment No 13 (1999) paras 
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obligation to take steps (as discussed herein below); an obligation to realise the 
minimum core content of substantive SERs;51 trade union rights;52 an obligation to 
ensure fair wages and equal remuneration for equal work;53 an obligation to take 
measures for the protection of children and young persons without discrimination; 
an obligation to penalise by law the employment of young children and young 
persons in dangerous or harmful work, and a duty to prohibit child labour;54 a duty 
to provide compulsory primary education free of charge;55 an obligation to respect 
the freedom of parents to choose schools for their children;56 an obligation to 
respect the freedom to establish and direct educational institutions;57 an obligation 
to respect the freedom essential for scientific research and creative activity;58 and an 
obligation to monitor the implementation of the Covenant rights,59 which includes 
the duty to submit initial and progressive reports to treaty monitoring bodies,60 
among others.61 The immediate nature of these duties is reflected in the wording of 
the rights, which provides for an undertaking to "ensure" and "guarantee".62 These 
obligations are thus not subject to the internal limitations of progression and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
31, 43; CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 30; CESCR General Comment No 15 (2002) 
paras 17, 37; CESCR General Comment No 16 (2005) paras 16, 32, 40; CESCR General Comment 
No 17 (2005) paras 25, 39; CESCR General Comment No 18 (2006) paras 19, 33; CESCR General 
Comment No 19 (2008) para 40; CESCR General Comment No 20 (2009) para 7; and CESCR 
General Comment No 21 (2009) paras 25, 44, 55, 66, 67. See also Limburg Principles principles 
16, 21 
50  CESCR General Comment No 20 (2009) para 7, which provides that "[n]on-discrimination is an 
immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the Covenant". The CESCR has also stated, in CESCR 
General Comment No 13 (1999) para. 43 that State Parties have an immediate obligation in 
relation to the right to education, such as the guarantee that the right will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind. 
51  Limburg Principles principle 25, which provides that "State Parties are obligated, regardless of 
the level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all". 
52  ICESCR a 8. 
53  ICESCR a 7(a)(i). 
54  ICESCR a 10(3). 
55  ICESCR a 13(2)(a); CESCR General Comment No 13 (1999) para 51. 
56  ICESCR a 13(3). 
57  ICESCR a 13(4). 
58  ICESCR a 15(3). 
59  In relation to housing, see CESCR General Comment No 4 (1999) para 13. Monitoring requires 
the development of relevant indicators and benchmarks for each of the substantive SERs. See 
Sepulveda Nature of Obligations 363. According to the Maastricht Guidelines guideline 15(f), 
failure to monitor the realisation of SER is a violation of the Covenant. 
60  Chapman 1996 Hum Rts Q 25. 
61  See Sepulveda Nature of Obligations 175,345; Chenwi 2010 www.spii.org.za 37ff. 
62  Chenwi 2010 www.spii.org.za 27; Alston and Quinn 1987 Hum Rts Q 185-186. 
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availability of resources. They can be validly limited by the State only as per the 
general limitation clause provided for in article 24 of the Constitution. 
 
2.3.2 Obligation to take steps 
 
In an effort to expeditiously realise SERs, the standard of progressive realisation 
requires the State to immediately take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps aimed 
at and capable of fully realising SERs.63 De Schutter avers that in order to fulfil this 
obligation as swiftly as possible, the State should adopt national strategies 
entrenched in legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks with quantified and 
time-based objectives reflected in sufficient benchmarks and monitoring indicators.64 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in their Voluntary Guidelines for 
the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National 
Food Security (2004) also reiterates that strategies for the progressive realisation of 
SERs must include objectives, targets, benchmarks, time-frames, and actions to 
formulate policies, identify and mobilise resources, define institutional mechanisms, 
allocate responsibilities, coordinate the activities of different actors and to provide 
for monitoring mechanisms.65 
 
The necessity for the adoption of reasonable steps in the realisation of SERs is also 
affirmed, at the national level in the South African SER jurisprudence which indicates 
that for such measures to be reasonable, they must meet the following criteria: they 
must be comprehensive, coherent and coordinated, and must also be properly 
conceived and implemented; they must be inclusive, balanced, flexible and make 
appropriate short-, medium- and long-term provisions for people in desperate need 
or in crisis situations, whose ability to enjoy all human rights is most in peril; they 
must clearly set out the responsibilities of the different spheres of government and 
ensure that financial and human resources are available for their implementation; 
they must be tailored to the particular context in which they are to apply and take 
account of the different economic levels in society; they must be continuously 
                                                 
63  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) paras 2, 4. 
64  De Schutter International Human Rights Law 462. 
65  FAO 2004 www.fao.org para 33. 
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reviewed because conditions change; they must be transparent and have their 
contents made known appropriately and effectively to the public; and they must 
allow for meaningful or reasonable engagement with the public or affected people 
and communities.66 
 
It is, however, important to note that unlike sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the South 
African Constitution, which require the implementation measures to be reasonable, 
the reasonableness of measures is not a feature of the Kenyan Constitution. Article 
21(2) only requires the State to take legislative and other measures for the 
progressive realisation of SERs in article 43 of the Constitution. The reasonableness 
of measures cannot thus be used as an internal limitation to the provision of 
entrenched SERs as it has been used by the South African courts in SER 
adjudication, where it was argued that it was a constitutional requirement.67 Kenyan 
courts must take this into account in the adjudication of SERs and not import SER 
limitations that are not envisaged by the Constitution itself. 
 
Though the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the Constitution is an important 
step, the State still has the responsibility to put in place sufficient legislative, policy 
and programmatic frameworks for the operationalisation of the constitutional 
provisions. This has to be done in accordance with the requisite standards discussed 
above. Therefore, to rely on the standard of progressive realisation as an internal 
limitation to SERs, the State must show the courts the steps it has taken to ensure 
that the rights are progressively realised, failing which, the internal limitation cannot 
be relied on and the State has to justify the non-realisation of the entrenched SERs 
using the article 24 general limitation clause. 
 
                                                 
66  Chenwi 2010 www.spii.org.za 35-37; Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 152-153; 
Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 124-131. 
67  For an elaborate analysis of how the reasonableness standard has been used to limit SERs in 
South Africa, see Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 138ff. 
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2.3.3 The maximum of available resources 
 
An important component of the standard of progressive realisation is resources, and 
the requirement that States expend the maximum of their available resources is an 
acknowledgment that the realisation of SERs in any particular State is vitally 
dependant on the economy of the State.68 This is due to the reality that States are 
not equally endowed in terms of resources and also have many and varied economic 
obligations which require balancing in the allocation of resources. However, even 
though the link between the available resources and the realisation of SERs calls for 
a margin of appreciation to be given to the government in the measures put in place 
to realise SERs, the discretion is not absolute, as it requires the prioritisation of 
social spending, especially to meet the urgent needs of the poor and vulnerable 
groups in society. This has been affirmed, at the international level by the CESCR, 
which has emphasised that even in situations of severe economic constraints, 
marginalised and vulnerable groups must be protected through the adoption of low-
cost targeted programmes.69 The CESCR has further developed criteria for the 
evaluation of States' resource constraint justifications for the non-realisation of SERs 
in the context of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which includes the following:70 
 
(a)  the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and 
targeted towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights; 
(b)  whether the State Party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and 
non-arbitrary manner; 
(c)  whether the State Party's decision (not) to allocate available resources was in 
accordance with international human rights standards; 
(d)  where several policy options are available, whether the State Party adopted 
the option that least restricts Covenant rights; 
(e)  the time frame in which the steps were taken; 
                                                 
68  Alston and Quinn 1987 Hum Rts Q 177-181. 
69  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) para 12; and CESCR General Comment No 15 (2002) para 
13. 
70  CESCR 2007 tbinternet.ohchr.org para 8. 
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(f)  whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals or groups, whether they were 
non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritised grave situations or situations 
of risk. 
 
The requirement for a substantive State justification in the instances where resource 
constraints have been raised for the non-realisation of SERs has also been affirmed, 
at the national level, by the SACC where it held, in the Metrorail case, that:71 
 
A final consideration will be the relevant human and financial resource constraints 
that may hamper the organ of state in meeting its obligation. This last criterion will 
require careful consideration when raised. In particular, an organ of State will not 
be held to have reasonably performed a duty simply by on the bald assertion of 
resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the resource constraints, 
whether human and financial, in the context of the overall resources of the organ of 
the State will need to be provided. 
 
The Kenyan courts must thus take into account the criteria developed by the CESCR 
when assessing the State's justification of resource constraints for the non-
realisation of SERs and must ensure that they undertake a careful analysis of such 
justifications, as was emphasised the SACC in the Metrorail case. 
 
In the Kenyan context, the Constitution recognises that resources for the realisation 
of SERs are scarce, and thus accords a margin of appreciation to the government in 
its adoption of measures and the allocation of resources in the realisation of SERs by 
providing as follows:72 
 
[T]he court, tribunal or other authority may not interfere with a decision by a State 
organ concerning the allocation of available resources, solely on the basis that it 
would have reached a different conclusion. 
                                                 
71  Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 88. 
72  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution a 20(5)(c). See, however, the case of Trusted Society of Human 
Rights Alliance v Attorney General High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No 229 of 2012 (the 
Mumo Matemu case) paras 77, 98.  Here the Court held that despite the doctrine of the 
separation of powers the courts still retained authority to review decisions by the executive to 
ensure that they were rationally/reasonably made and that they were compliant with both 
procedural and substantive constitutional requirements. 
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However, this discretion of the government to rely on the unavailability of resources 
as a defence for the non-realisation of SERs is not absolute, and is constrained by 
the Constitution itself, which places the onus on the government to demonstrate the 
unavailability of resources.73 The Constitution further requires the government to 
prioritise its resources in the realisation of its SERs obligations by providing as 
follows:74 
 
[I]n allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest 
possible enjoyment of the right or fundamental freedom having regard to prevailing 
circumstances, including the vulnerability of particular groups or individuals. 
 
In relation to vulnerable and marginalised groups, the Constitution further provides 
for the prioritisation of resources towards the fulfilment of their needs.75 The 
requirement that the SER needs of marginalised and vulnerable groups be prioritised 
is further reflected in article 53 of the Constitution, which is not made subject to the 
standard of progressive realisation. The use of the availability of resources as an 
internal limitation of SERs is thus not absolute and if the State fails to prioritise the 
realisation of the socio-economic needs of the vulnerable and marginalised groups in 
society, it has to justify such failure through the general limitation clause entrenched 
in article 24 of the Constitution.  
 
2.3.4  Prohibition of retrogressive measures 
 
The use of the term "progressive" necessarily prohibits the adoption of retrogressive 
measures by the State in the realisation of SERs. According to Sepulveda, 
progression entails two complementary obligations: "the obligation to continuously 
improve conditions, and the obligation to abstain from taking deliberately 
retrogressive measures except under specific circumstances".76 The CESCR has been 
very assertive against retrogressive measures in its general comments, delineating 
                                                 
73  The Constitution, a 20(5)(a). 
74  The Constitution, a 20(5)(b). For an affirmation of the obligation of the State to protect the 
rights of vulnerable and marginalised groups, see Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General 
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Petition No 164 of 2011 27-29. 
75  The Constitution, a 21(3). 
76  Sepulveda Nature of Obligations 319. 
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very stringent conditions for such retrogressive steps to be acceptable. It has 
affirmed that deliberately retrogressive measures must be fully justified in relation to 
the totality of the Covenant rights and in the context of the maximum use of 
available resources.77 
 
The CESCR has further elaborated in General Comment Number 19, in relation to 
social security, the criteria that it will use when considering the justifiability of 
retrogressive measures. The criteria include the reasonableness of the action; 
comprehensive examination and consideration of alternatives to the retrogressive 
action; the genuine participation of the affected groups in decision-making; the long-
term adverse impact of the action and whether or not it deprives access to the 
minimum essential levels of rights; and the presence of independent national 
review.78 However, despite the flexibility allowing States to justify retrogressive 
measures, the CESCR in General Comment Number 14 has further stated that any 
such measures which affect the minimum core content of Covenant rights is a 
violation of the Covenant.79 The Maastricht Guidelines also provide that the adoption 
of deliberately retrogressive measures by States is a violation of their obligation 
under the Covenant.80 These requirements for the justification of a retrogressive 
measure are more in line with the proportionality requirements entrenched in article 
24 of the Constitution, and thus retrogressive measures limiting the entrenched 
SERs must be justified using the entrenched general limitation clause. 
 
The adoption in the 2010 Constitution of the standard of progressive realisation does 
not leave the entrenched SERs bereft of content, but requires the Kenyan 
government to move expeditiously towards their realisation by taking immediate, 
comprehensive and targeted steps capable of their realisation. This obligation was 
affirmed by the High Court of Kenya in Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General 
                                                 
77  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) para 9; CESCR General Comment No 13 (1999) para 45; 
CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 32. 
78  CESCR General Comment No 19 (2008) para 42. Retrogression must be justified by a reference 
to the totality of the rights in the Covenant taking into account the state's full use of the 
maximum of its available resources. 
79  CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 48.  
80  Maastricht Guidelines guideline 14(e). 
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and further reiterated in the case of Okwanda v The Minister of Health and Medical 
Services as follows:81 
 
Articles 21and 43 require that there should be 'progressive realisation' of [SERs], 
implying that the state must begin to take steps, and I might add be seen to take 
steps, towards realisation of these rights…. Its obligation requires that it assists the 
court by showing if, and how, it is addressing or intends to address the rights of 
citizens to the attainment of the [SERs], and what policies, if any, it has put in 
place to ensure that the rights are realised progressively, and how the petitioners in 
this case fit into its policies and plans. 
 
A discussion of the limitations of the entrenched SERs under the new constitutional 
dispensation in Kenya is not, however, limited to the internal limitation clause 
espoused in the progressive realisation standard as discussed above. This 
prioritisation of some SERs in the Constitution is due to the important function they 
serve in a democratic society or because of the vulnerability of the particular societal 
group that they aim to protect. These prioritised SERs include the labour relation 
rights in article 41, consumer rights in article 46, the rights of children to free and 
compulsory basic education as well as basic nutrition, shelter and healthcare in 
article 53(1)(b) and (c),82 the rights of minorities and marginalised groups in article 
56, and the rights of older persons in article 57. Despite the lack of internal 
qualifiers, these priority rights, as well as the other SERs with internal qualifiers, are 
subject to the general limitations clause contained in article 24 of the Constitution,83 
a clause which is discussed more elaborately in the section below. 
 
                                                 
81  Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Petition No 164 of 
2011 21-23, 31; Okwanda v The Minister of Health and Medical Services High Court of Kenya at 
Nairobi, Petition No 94 of 2012 paras 15, 16. 
82  See De Vos 1997 SAJHR 88 who argues, in the context of the South African Constitution, that in 
enumerating the rights of children as clear, near-absolute core entitlements, the Constitution 
acknowledges the necessity to provide the basic subsistence needs of children, the most 
vulnerable groups in any State. 
83  Heyns and Brand 1998 LDD 163. 
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3  Limitation of socio-economic rights under the general limitation 
clause 
 
The incorporation of a general limitations clause in legal instruments, national or 
international, is a recognition of the non-absolute nature of rights. Limitation is thus 
a legitimate way in which legal instruments accommodate the democratic conflict 
between entrenched rights and competing social interests.84 The non-absolute 
nature of human rights and the legitimacy of a limitations clause in a constitutional 
system were affirmed by the SACC in the case of De Reuck v Director of Public 
Prosecution,85 where the Court acknowledged the importance of harmonious co-
existence in society and noted the need for a balancing process should individual 
rights be in conflict.86 
 
However, it is important to emphasise that SER obligations can be limited by the 
State only in particular instances and in accordance with the provisions of the legal 
instrument containing the rights, so as to enhance the culture of justification and 
accountability for the use of public power. The following criteria must generally be 
met both at the national and international levels for the restrictions on rights to be 
legal: the objectives justifying such limitation must be legitimate; the limitation must 
be prescribed by law; and the limitation must not be disproportionate, meaning that 
it must not exceed the aim envisioned by the particular limitation.87 The restriction 
on limitation is based on the principle that the exercise of public power derives its 
                                                 
84  Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-1. The first national constitution to engender the limitation of 
rights was the German Basic Law (German Constitution of 23 May 1949). For a comprehensive 
analysis of limitation under the German Basic Law, see Pati 2005 Berkeley J Int'l L 234-342. 
85  De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2002 12 BCLR 1285 
(CC) para 89. 
86  As above. See also Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; 
Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 930 (CC) para 57; S v Mamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) 
para 32. In Mamela, the Court affirmed the need for a balancing exercise based on the 
proportionality principle, holding that the more serious the impact of limitation, the more 
stringent the criteria for its justification and the more onerous the requirements for its 
justification. (The justifications must be persuasive and compelling.) 
87  De Schutter International Human Rights Law 241. See also S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 
para 104. 
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force from the relevant legal instrument, be it a treaty or a constitution, and must, 
therefore, be justified with reference to that particular legal instrument.88 
 
The entrenchment of a general limitation clause is not a new concept in the Kenyan 
constitutional jurisprudence, with the 1963 Independent Constitution having 
contained a limitations clause.89 A reading of the limitation clause, however, 
indicates that it was not meant to be a general limitations clause per se, but was 
only a reference to the internal limitations within the specific rights in the Bill of 
Rights. The internal limitations were, however, to be construed restrictively as they 
were meant to operate to curtail the enjoyment of rights only in instances where the 
exercise of rights prejudiced the rights and freedoms of others or the public 
interest.90 In Changanlal v Kericho Urban District Council, a case dealing with the 
compulsory acquisition of private property, the Court for example held that such an 
acquisition was subject to the payment of compensation and no legislation would 
pass constitutional muster if it took private property without compensation.91 
 
With the promulgation of the new Constitution in 2010, this tradition of the 
incorporation of a general limitation clause was continued in article 24, which 
provides clear grounds for the legitimate limitation of rights. It provides that rights 
can be limited only in accordance with the law, and only to the extent that is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality, and freedom. Further safeguards are provided to ensure that the 
limitations of rights are legitimate, and they include:92 
 
  
                                                 
88  Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-7. 
89  See Constitution of Kenya, 1963 s 70. 
90  Internal limitations included those related to the compulsory acquisition of private property (s 
75) and arbitrary search or entry (s 76(2)). See generally Mutakha-Kangu 2008 LSKJ 1 who 
contends that due to the pervasive nature of the internal limitations in the Bill of Rights, it has 
been described as a bill of exceptions. 
91  Changanlal v Kericho Urban District Council 1965 EA 370. 
92  2010 Kenyan Constitution a 24(1). 
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(a)  the nature of the right or fundamental freedom;93 
(b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation;94 
(c)  the nature and extent of the limitation;95 
(d)  the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms 
by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others; and 
(e)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
Article 24(2) further provides safeguards where a limitation is contained in legislation 
and it provides that such limitation is not valid unless it specifically expresses the 
intention to limit a particular right in a clear and specific manner, as well as the 
nature and extent of that limitation.96 It not only calls for the strict construction of 
legislative provisions limiting rights, but also prohibits any limitations that have the 
effect of derogating from the core or essential content of rights leading to the rights 
being ineffective or illusory.97 It places the burden of proof as to the legitimacy of a 
limitation on the authority or organ imposing the limitation in question. 
 
Due to the similarities between the provisions of the general limitation clause and 
limitation clauses contained in international and regional human rights instruments 
as well as in comparative national jurisdictions such as South Africa, it is necessary 
                                                 
93  See Woolman 1997 SAJHR 108-110, who contends that this factor forms an important 
component of the limitation clause as it determines the level of scrutiny a given limitation will 
receive and that the more important a right is to the overall constitutional project, the stricter 
the scrutiny on its limitation. 
94  See Woolman 1997 SAJHR 109-110. He states that this limitations factor is a threshold question 
and not a balancing question. He argues that: "If the objective of the limitation cannot justify the 
infringement of a fundamental right, then the limitation inquiry ends. There need be no 
comparison of the competing interests at play". 
95  Woolman 1997 SAJHR 110-111 is of the view that this should be the last factor to be considered 
by the courts in a limitation analysis as it involves a cost-benefit analysis which is intended to 
ensure that the limitation of rights "does not impose costs or burdens upon the rights-holder(s) 
which far outweigh the benefits said to flow to other members of society". He argues that it 
should be the last inquiry as it places the courts under the greatest political pressure due to the 
need for them to revisit the compromises of the competing social interests struck by the political 
branches of the State. 
96  The Constitution, a 24(2)(a)-(b). 
97  The Constitution, a 24(2)(b)-(c). 
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that in trying to understand and interpret these provisions the courts should look for 
inspiration from such comparable jurisdictions.  
 
An analysis of the interpretation and application of general limitation clauses in some 
of these jurisdictions is undertaken below with the aim of providing a general guide 
to Kenyan courts in the use of the general limitation clause in the adjudication of 
SERs and further to support the proposal that Kenyan courts adopt a proportionality 
test to ensure stringent scrutiny of government action aimed at limiting SERs in the 
Kenyan context. 
 
3.1  Limitations of socio-economic rights in the international sphere 
 
At the international level, the ICESCR acknowledges the possibility of the limitation 
of the SERs entrenched therein. The limitation clause is contained in article 4, which 
provides that SERs can be limited as provided by law, and that such limitation must 
be compatible with the nature of the rights, and must be done only for the purpose 
of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. In its interpretation of 
article 4 of the ICESCR, the CESCR stated in its General Comment Number 14 that 
"the Covenant's limitation clause, article 4, is primarily intended to protect the rights 
of individuals rather than to permit the imposition of limitations by States and that 
any State which imposes restrictive measures on the enjoyment of rights 'has the 
burden of justifying such serious measures in relation to each of the elements 
identified in article 4'".98 The CESCR emphasised that:99 
 
Such restrictions must be in accordance with the law, including international human 
rights standards, compatible with the nature of the rights protected by the 
Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims pursued, and strictly necessary for the 
promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
                                                 
98  CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 28. 
99  CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 28. 
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The CESCR further contended that measures limiting rights must be proportionate 
and that where several choices are available, the measure least restrictive to the full 
enjoyment of rights must be adopted.100 It also emphasised that limitation measures 
must be resorted to for a limited period of time only, and that they must be subject 
to review.101 
 
Article 5 of the ICESCR further prohibits the destruction of SERs or the imposition of 
limitations exceeding the extent envisioned by the Covenant.102 The Covenant goes 
further to espouse the principle of the permeability and interdependence of rights by 
foreclosing the use of its provisions as a pretext to limit or lower the level of 
protection of any other rights provided for in other treaties or national law.103 Article 
5(2) is thus a saving provision aimed at preserving the sanctity of laws.104 
 
The Limburg Principles also provide that these articles (articles 4 and 5 of the 
ICESCR) were meant to protect rights rather than to permit the imposition of 
limitations, and calls for their strict interpretation.105 It interprets the provision 
'determined by law' as referring to a national law of general application, which must 
be clear and accessible to everybody, must be consistent with the Covenant, and 
must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.106 It further requires that 
adequate safeguards as well as effective remedies be put in place to protect and to 
provide the requisite redress should the limiting law be abused or used illegally.107 
For the limitation to be compatible with the nature of the rights, it should not be 
interpreted or applied in such a manner as to jeopardise the essence of the right in 
question or to render the rights ineffective or illusory.108 The Limburg Principles 
further state that the 'general welfare' requirement in article 4 of the ICESCR should 
be interpreted to ensure that limitations are aimed at furthering the economic, social 
                                                 
100  CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 29. 
101  CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) para 29. 
102  ICESCR a 5(1). 
103  ICESCR a 5(2). 
104  Sseyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 102. 
105  Limburg Principles principles 46-69. 
106  Limburg Principles principles 48-50. See also Sseyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 100-
101. 
107  Limburg Principles principles 50-51. 
108  Limburg Principles principle 56. 
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and cultural well-being of the people as a whole, meaning that a proper 
proportionality test must be undertaken if the limitation is to be justified.109 The 
proportionality test must be undertaken within the context of a democratic society 
characterised by pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness, taking into account the 
views of minority groups and preventing the arbitrary, totalitarian imposition of 
limitations on minority groups by the majority.110 
 
The interpretation of article 4 of the ICESCR in the Limburg Principles is informed by 
the work of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, especially the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of the Provisions in the ICCPR.111 Though based on the ICCPR, the 
Siracusa Principles provide general interpretive principles relating to the justification 
of limitations that have application across all the international treaties allowing for 
the limitation of rights. Some of the principles include: the prohibition of limitations 
that jeopardise the essence of the rights; the strict interpretation of limitation 
clauses in favour of rights, and in accordance with the nature of the right; the 
compatibility of limitations with the objects and purpose of the Covenant; the non-
discriminatory and non-arbitrary application of limitations; the provision of 
safeguards and remedies against the abusive use of limitations; necessity as the 
basis of limitations on justifiable Covenant grounds; and, the proportionate pursuit of 
legitimate aims responsive to public needs in accordance with the Covenant.112 
 
The CESCR has not substantively expounded on the interpretation of article 4 in a 
General Comment.113 However, guidance can be sought from the work of the Human 
Rights Committee, especially its General Comment Number 27, where it provides 
that permissible limitation must be provided by law and the law must determine all 
the conditions under which the right may be limited.114 It further provides that the 
                                                 
109  Limburg Principles principle 52. See also Sseyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 101. 
110  Sseyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 101. 
111  ECOSOC 1985 www.uio.no (Siracusa Principles). 
112  Siracusa Principles principles 1-14. 
113  A reference was made to a 4 by the CESCR in CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) paras 28, 
29. 
114  CCPR General Comment No 27 (1999) paras 11-12. 
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limitation must be necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
Covenant-acknowledged purposes, must not impair the essence of the right, must 
not confer unfettered discretion on the authority charged with their execution, must 
conform to the principles of proportionality, must be appropriate to achieve their 
intended purpose, and must be the least intrusive among the available options.115 
 
The conditions under which the limitation of rights is permissible at the international 
level have been affirmed by several judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The Inter-
American Court in an Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Word "Law" in 
Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights has affirmed the importance 
of guarantees and safeguards to fetter the discretion of governments in the 
application of limitations so that the inviolable attributes of the individual are not 
impaired.116 The European Court on Human Rights has also held that even though 
States could legitimately limit rights, they must do so in a manner which is 
compatible with their international law obligations, and such limitations must be 
subject to review by the treaty-monitoring mechanisms.117 It further held that in 
undertaking these review functions, the Court must ascertain the necessity of the 
limitation, especially with regard to an existing pressing social need, and the 
proportionality of the limitation in relation to the purpose sought to be achieved.118 
Similarly in the Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom, the European Court held 
that rights are subject to a number of exceptions, which must be narrowly 
interpreted, and the necessity for limitation convincingly established.119 It stated that 
"necessary" must imply the existence of a pressing social need, and that even 
though States have discretion in the imposition of limitations; the same is subject to 
                                                 
115  CCPR General Comment No 27 (1999) paras 13-16. 
116  The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights Advisory Opinion 
OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 6 (1986) paras 22-24. The Court held that the 
legitimacy of a limitation is guaranteed in its passing through the national legislative process and 
the opportunity being given to the people, through their representatives to express their 
disagreements or to propose different optional initiatives. 
117  Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland 64/1991/316/387-388, 23 September 1992 para 
69. 
118  Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland 64/1991/316/387-388, 23 September 1992 para 
70. 
119  The Observer and the Guardian v The United Kingdom Application No 13585/88, Judgement of 
26 November 1991 paras 59(a), 60. 
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the overall supervision of the treaty-monitoring bodies.120 The Court further held, in 
relation to proportionality, that it has to look at the limitation in question in the light 
of the national context as a whole. In doing this, the Court has to determine 
whether the limitation is proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued, and 
whether the State's justifications are relevant and sufficient.121 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that limitation clauses in international legal 
instruments are aimed at enhancing the protection of rights and giving national 
governments adequate space to ensure that they are able to realise their 
international obligations, taking into account their unique domestic situation. 
However, due to the possibility of the illegal use of limitation clauses to detract from 
the full protection of rights, the prevailing practice in international law is for the 
restrictive interpretation of limitation clauses and the undertaking of a proportionality 
test to ensure that limitation clauses are adopted in a democratic manner and are 
aimed at enhancing the general welfare of the society as a whole. In undertaking 
SER adjudication, especially in instances when the political institutions of the State 
are seeking to limit the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the 
Kenyan Courts must take into account and be informed by the jurisprudence 
emanating from the international level on the limitations of rights. 
 
3.2  Limitations of socio-economic rights in the regional sphere 
 
The question of the limitation of rights in the African Human Rights System (AHRS) 
has raised some debate due to the lack of a general limitations clause in the African 
Charter and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well as the African 
Children's Charter, unlike other regional human rights instruments.122 Concerns 
about limitations are specifically greater in relation to the SERs in these instruments, 
                                                 
120  The Observer and the Guardian v The United Kingdom Application No 13585/88, Judgement of 
26 November 1991 paras9 59(c). 
121  The Observer and the Guardian v The United Kingdom Application No 13585/88, Judgement of 
26 November 1991 para 59(d). 
122  Viljoen International Human Rights Law 348-352; Ouguergouz African Charter 425. 
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as they do not contain internal limitations or claw-back clauses, as is the case with 
the Charter-entrenched CPRs. In response to this debate the African Commission has 
identified article 27(2)123 as the general limitations clause and has developed 
limitations jurisprudence around the article.124 The Commission has affirmed that a 
law limiting rights must be of general application,125 and must be in conformity with 
the provisions of the African Charter.126 It has then propounded a proportionality 
test which balances the nature and extent of the limitation imposed vis-à-vis the 
legitimate State interest aimed to be protected by the limitation. In the Media Rights 
case the Commission stated as follows:127 
 
The reasons for possible limitation must be founded in a legitimate State interest 
and the evils of limitation of rights must be strictly proportionate with, and 
absolutely necessary for, the advantages which are to be obtained. Even more 
important, a limitation may never have as a consequence that the right itself 
becomes illusory. 
 
The Commission is thus basically contending that any use of the limitations clause 
must meet the basic requirements of legality, necessity and the prohibition of 
arbitrariness.128 It has further found, when undertaking the proportionality analysis, 
that if there is more than one way of achieving the legitimate State objective, the 
measure that least limits rights must be adopted.129 The Commission thus contends 
that the onus of proving the legitimacy of the limitation of a right is on the State, 
and that once the fact of the limitation of a right has been proven, it is up to the 
government in question to justify the reasonableness of that limitation.130 
 
                                                 
123  It provides that "[t]he rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard 
to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest". 
124  See Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria 2000 AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) (Media Rights case) para 68; 
Prince v South Africa 2004 AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004) (Prince case) para 43. 
125  Media Rights case para 71; Prince case para 44. 
126  Media Rights case para 66. 
127  Media Rights case paras 69-70; Prince case para 43. 
128  Ouguergouz African Charter 430. 
129  Interights v Mauritania 2004 AHRLR 87 (ACHPR 2004) para 82-85. 
130  Media Rights case para 73. The Commission states that the Nigerian government had not 
provided any evidence to justify its limitation of the freedom of expression. See also Amnesty 
International v Zambia 2000 AHRLR 325 (ACHPR 1999) para 50, where the Commission not only 
cautioned against a too easy resort to the use of limitation, but also found that the onus is on 
the State to prove that it is justified in resorting to the use of the limitation clause 
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The object and purpose of the legal instruments in the AHRS are to confer protection 
on individuals, and the limitations clause must be interpreted with this in mind. 
Ouguergouz argues that having the object and purpose of the African Charter in 
mind, article 27(2) should be given the most restrictive interpretation possible so as 
to enhance the protection of the rights entrenched in the Charter.131 In undertaking 
adjudication relating to the realisation of SERs, the Kenyan Courts may therefore 
have to take into account the regional jurisprudence on the limitation of rights 
emerging from the AHRS, especially the adoption of a proportionality approach 
aimed at ensuring that rights achieve their intended objectives. 
 
3.3  Limitations of socio-economic rights under the 1996 South African 
Constitution  
The article 24(1) limitations clause is very similar to section 36 of the 1996 South 
African Constitution.132 The section 36 clause has been subject to comprehensive 
judicial and academic interpretation over the years, and the jurisprudence emanating 
from that interpretation can be used to enhance the understanding of limitations in 
the Kenyan context. The SACC has utilised the limitations clause in a two-stage 
constitutional analysis which looks, first, at whether there has been a contravention 
of the guaranteed right, and secondly, whether the contravention is justified under 
the limitations clause.133 Woolman characterises these two stages as follows: the 
fundamental rights stage - which entails an 'inquiry into the nature of the right 
limited and its importance in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality'; and the limitation stage - which "directs our attention primarily, if not 
exclusively, to the reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, freedom and equality".134 Both of the 
two stages espouse a value-based approach, with the nature, scope and content of 
                                                 
131  Ouguergouz African Charter 432-433. 
132  These grounds of limitation and the requirement that the court undertakes a proportionality test 
taking into account the necessity, suitability and appropriateness of limitations were first 
entrenched in the German Basic Law (1949) a 19, see Pati 2005 Berkeley J Int'l L 238. 
133  S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 414; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para. 100. See also 
Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-3 - 34-4; Iles 2004 SAJHR 453-455; and Brand Courts, 
Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 100-101 
134  Woolman 1997 SAJHR 108. 
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rights in the first stage being animated by the constitutional values of openness, 
democracy, human dignity, freedom, equality and equity;135 while the second stage 
of the limitations analysis is also animated by these constitutional values.136 In this 
scheme of things, the first part of the test involves the responsibility of the 
applicant137 while the second part of the test burdens the person or authority who 
seeks to limit rights to justify the limitations.138 
 
In undertaking the first stage of the analysis, which basically involves the 
interpretation and development of the meaning, nature, content and extent of the 
right in question139 and the assessment of whether the offending legislation140 
impairs or limits the defined content of the rights, the SACC has used an approach 
based on the text, the context and the foundational values.141 It involves the 
analysis of the right's text in context, which entails a consideration of the historical 
background of both the constitution and of the right; the reasons for its inclusion as 
a constitutional right; the concepts enshrined in the right, and their legal elaboration 
under national, international and comparative law; the other constitutional 
provisions, particularly other rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights; and, the 
foundational values.142 This stage entails the analysis of the internal 
                                                 
135  The Constitution, aa 20(4)(a), 259(1). 
136  The Constitution, a 24(1). For an analysis of the value-based approach to a limitations analysis, 
see Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 16-29. 
137  During this first stage of the two-stage limitations analysis, the South African Constitutional Court 
has adopted an objective approach of unconstitutionality, which holds that the finding of 
invalidity is not dependent on the parties before the Court (the subjective approach). This is to 
prevent a situation where the law can be held invalid for one litigant and valid for another 
litigant. The theory also espouses a generous interpretation of locus standi rules to allow 
applicants who have not been directly affected by a limitation of rights to bring cases to court. 
See Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 42-43, note 5. 
138  See Moise v Transitional Local Council of Greater Germiston 2001 4 SA 491 (CC) para 19, which 
confirms that once a limitation is proven, the burden of justification rests on the party seeking to 
rely on the limitation, and the analysis of the justification will depend on the balancing of 
competing interests. 
139  Ackerman J in Ferreira v Levin, and Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 252. 
140  For it to be legitimate, a limitation clause must be entrenched in a law of general application and 
not on a policy or executive act. This is to guarantee rights by giving only the legislature the 
power to limit rights. See Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-8 - 30-9. 
141  Ferreira v Levin, and Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 46.  
142  Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-5; Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-19 - 34-32. 
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demarcations/qualification of rights and their circumscription of the scope of 
rights.143 
 
The second stage, which encompasses the proportionality test, entails the analysis 
of the reasonableness and the justification of the limitation, in the context of a 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and using the 
factors listed in section 36(1) (similar to article 24(1) of the Kenyan Constitution).144 
Relying on Canadian jurisprudence in relation to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Cheadle contends that this analysis should not be a balance 
between the importance of the right as against the purpose of the limitation, but an 
analysis of the propriety and viability of the means used to limit the right.145 He 
quotes the Canadian case of R v Oakes, which not only calls for the proportionality 
test after a sufficiently significant objective of the limitation has been established, 
but also details three important components of the proportionality test, which are:146 
 
First, measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in 
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations… 
they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if 
rationally connected to the objective in the first sense, should impair as little as 
possible the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be proportionality 
between the effects of the limiting measures and the objective which has been 
identified as of sufficient importance. 
 
It is thus important that in determining the justifiability of legislation limiting rights, 
the Kenyan courts must take the above factors into consideration and ensure that 
the raison d'être of the respective entrenched rights in the Bill of Rights is achieved. 
 
Interestingly, the general limitations clause has not been used in the South African 
jurisprudence on SERs, as evidenced by the Grootboom and the Treatment Action 
                                                 
143  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 187. 
144  Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-9 - 30-11; Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-26 - 34-27. 
They contend that for the respondent to succeed at the limitation stage, the respoomdent must 
satisfy all the limitation clause's requirements as provided in s 36(1). For an extensive analysis of 
the jurisprudence of the SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT in relation to the 
understanding of the factors involved in the proportionality analysis, see Woolman and Botha 
"Limitations" 34-47 - 34-103. 
145  Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-11 - 30-12. 
146  R v Oakes 1986 26 DLR (4th) 200 227, quoted in Cheadle "Limitation of Rights" 30-11. 
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Campaign147 cases.148 This is due to the requirement that for a limitation on rights to 
be legitimate, it must be contained in a law of general application, which was not the 
case with the two decisions.149 However, a limitation analysis was also not 
undertaken in the Khosa case, which dealt with the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, 
the Court deciding the case on the criterion of reasonableness.150 The Court explicitly 
acknowledged the difficulty of applying section 36 in SER cases due to the internal 
limitation requiring the State "to go no further than to take 'reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation' of the rights".151 Justice Mokgoro, writing for the majority, was of the 
view that the use of either the reasonableness review or the proportionality analysis 
will achieve the same results, and she supported her finding as follows:152 
 
If a legislative measure taken by the State to meet this obligation fails to pass the 
requirement of reasonableness for the purposes of sections 26 and 27, section 36 
can only have relevance if what is 'reasonable' for the purposes of that section, is 
different to what is 'reasonable' for the purposes of sections 26 and 27. 
 
In the same judgment Justice Ngcobo asked if the standard of determining 
reasonableness under section 27(2) was a similar standard to that of determining 
reasonableness and justifiability under section 36(1), but did not suggest how the 
two sections could be used in the context of SER adjudication, preferring to state 
that an analysis using either of the sections would lead to the same conclusion.153 
 
Iles, however, argues that the reasonableness analysis under the internal limitation 
clauses is totally distinct from the limitation justifications required by section 36 of 
                                                 
147  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 1) 2002 5 SA 703 (CC). 
148  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 594; Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and 
Transformative Politics 101, 120ff. Brand notes that the courts have interpreted the qualification 
of "reasonable legislative and other measures within available resources" as an internal limitation 
clause, and have thus developed a 'reasonableness standard' to scrutinise the positive SER 
obligations of the State, a standard which he terms as a varying "means-end effectiveness test". 
149  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 594. 
150  Khosa v Minister of Social Development, Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 
505 (CC) (Khosa case). 
151  Khosa case para 82. For an in-depth analysis, see generally, Iles 2004 SAJHR 448ff. 
152  Khosa case para 82. 
153  Khoss case paras 105-107. See Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-37 fn 2, who conclude that 
Ngcobo J's analysis leads us nowhere. 
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the South African Constitution.154 He contends that the internal limitation analysis as 
per the Grootboom reasonableness test is aimed at the examination of the plan for 
the realisation of rights: that is, how and when the right is to be realised; the order 
in which differing needs are to be prioritised; the resources to be expended towards 
the realisation of the right; the ultimate comprehensiveness of the plan; and how 
the plan is to be implemented.155 In relation to a section 36 limitation he argues as 
follows:156 
 
Section 36 reasonableness is directed not at a plan for realising rights (as 
Grootboom reasonableness is) but at an examination of the reasonableness of 
measures that limit rights. Rights are not limited by plans that are designed to give 
effect to them. [SERs] are limited rather by a lack of available resources, an 
alternative policy emphasis by the State, or an omission of certain groups from a 
realisation plan. Grootboom reasonableness does not involve choosing one value 
from a cluster of incommensurable values as s 36 reasonableness sometimes does. 
 
He concludes his argument by stating that the "Grootboom reasonableness test is 
concerned with whether a plan is capable of reasonably achieving a right and not, as 
in section 36 reasonableness, whether the limitation of the right is rationally 
achieving its purpose".157 
 
Many commentators have contributed to the debate on the applicability of a general 
limitations analysis in the context of internally limited SERs. Currie and de Waal 
argue that even though a law of general application can only feasibly limit the 
negative aspect of SER obligations,158 such a law would be held to be unreasonable 
in the first stage of the interpretation analysis as the principle of reasonableness has 
been included in the demarcation of SERs, and that the courts would not have to 
                                                 
154  Iles 2004 SAJHR 456-457. 
155  Iles 2004 SAJHR 456-457. 
156  Iles 2004 SAJHR 456-457. 
157  Iles 2004 SAJHR 456-457. See also Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 40-41, who point out the 
textual distinction between the internal limitation clauses and the general limitation clause, 
contending that while the internal limitation analysis relates to the specific right in question, the 
general limitations analysis entails a wider analysis that takes into account a whole range of 
factors that are unrelated to the right in question. 
158  See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 594, who argue that since most SER litigation 
concerned with positive obligations is likely to be due to omissions, s 36 analysis will be 
irrelevant due to the requirement of a law of general application.  
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proceed to undertake a general limitation analysis.159 However, Pieterse, relying on 
the judgment of Budlender AJ in the Residents of Bon Vista Mansion case, contends 
that the application of section 36 is necessary in relation to the duty to respect SERs, 
if limitations of such duties are to pass constitutional muster.160 He argues that 
violations of SERs should be analysed not only using the principle of reasonableness, 
but must also be justified with reference to an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, and that a proportionality test taking into 
account all the relevant factors should be undertaken.161 
 
Pieterse's approach was seemingly taken up by the SACC in the Jaftha case.162 In 
this case, the court not only acknowledged the existence of negative SER obligations 
in sections 26(1) and 27(1) of the South African Constitution,163 but also held that 
where the State limits those obligations, such a limitation must be justified under 
section 36.164 The Court proceeded to undertake a limitations analysis under section 
36 and held that the breach of section 26(1) was not reasonable and justifiable in 
terms of section 36 because of the importance of access to housing and its link to 
dignity, the seriousness of the infringement, and the existence of less restrictive 
means.165 
 
Liebenberg, affirming the importance of section 36 in relation to SERs, contends 
that:166 
 
[t]he State's purpose in limiting a right should not be solely for reasons of 
administrative convenience, cost-saving or a re-prioritisation of resources. Allowing 
these reasons to constitute sufficient grounds of limitation will strip the rights of all 
effect. In order to justify a limitation on these rights under section 36, the State will 
have to argue that the restriction based on resource constraints is reasonably 
                                                 
159  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 594-595. 
160  Pieterse 2003 SALJ 45-46. The Court in Bon Vista did not engage in a 36 analysis despite the 
presence of a law of general application, Water Services Act 108 of 1997, because the 
respondents had not fashioned any arguments justifying the use of the limitation. 
161  Pieterse 2003 SALJ 47. 
162  Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) (Jaftha case). The case involved the validity of the 
Magistrates' Court Act, which permitted the sale of a person's home in execution of a civil debt. 
163  Jaftha case paras 32, 33. 
164  Jaftha case para 34. 
165  Jaftha case paras 35-49; Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 33-35 - 33-46. 
166  Khosa, para 84. 
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required in the interests of the general welfare in a democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. In addition, the nature and degree of the 
restriction must be carefully tailored to fit these purposes (the proportionality 
test).167 
The existence of this debate on the use of section 36 in SER cases was 
acknowledged by the Court in the Khosa case, but it did not provide any guidance 
on the same as this was unnecessary for the determination of the case. 
 
This whole debate strangely rests squarely on the approach to interpretation and 
implementation of SERs that has been adopted by the courts in a particular domestic 
jurisdiction. In the South African context, the adoption of the reasonableness 
approach in the interpretation of SERs of necessity undermines the value of a 
section 36 analysis in instances where the State has failed to take adequate 
measures to realise progressively the right in question.168 However, if the country's 
Constitutional Court had adopted the minimum core approach and given clearer 
content to the entrenched SERs, more stringent justifications would have been 
required in the instances where the State had failed to meet its minimum core 
obligations of providing the minimum essential goods and services, especially for the 
most marginalised and vulnerable groups.169 This is due to the immediate nature of 
the minimum core obligations, and the developments in international human rights 
law to the effect that a lack of resources is no longer a justification for the non-
fulfilment of these obligations.170 This reasoning is supported by the arguments of 
Davis who, in analysing the Khosa decision, contends as follows:171 
                                                 
167  Liebenberg "Violations of Socio-economic Rights" 424. See also Liebenberg Socio-economic 
Rights Adjudication 185-186 where she contends that a failure to provide basic socio-economic 
needs should be justified only if resources are demonstrably inadequate, and that such serious 
restrictions warrant a strict proportionality assessment using the criteria in the s 36 general 
limitation clause. 
168  See Iles 2004 SAJHR 454, who alludes to some of the difficulties associated with the 
reasonableness approach in the context of rights limitation by contending that the failure of the 
South Africa's Constitutional Court to engage in the task of defining the scope and content of 
SERs has led to the difficulty of the use of s 36 in SER limitations analysis.  
169  Iles 2004 SAJHR 458, who argues that if the Constitutional Court had adopted the minimum core 
approach, s 36 would have played a more meaningful role in justifying failures to realise the 
minimum core, while the internal limitation would serve to justify a failure to expand the 
realisation of SERs beyond the minimum core. 
170  CESCR General Comment No 3 (1990) para 10 allows States to use the justification of resource 
constraints if they fail to realise their minimum core obligations, though it requires a high 
threshold which is fulfilled if a State is able to show that it has used all the resources at its 
disposal to satisfy its minimum core obligations as a matter of priority. However, the Committee 
has contended in the later General Comments such as CESCR General Comment No 14 (2002) 
para 47 and CESCR General Comment No 15 (2002) para 40 that the realisation of the minimum 
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Once section 27(l) and (2) are read together to determine the content of the right, 
it should follow that the right, as defined, is then subject to limitation if such 
limiting measures pass muster in terms of section 36. Thus, if the right taking 
account of the internal limitation is defined, a failure to grant the right to litigants 
should fall within the general limitation clause. The Constitutional Court, however, 
prefers a more extensive role for the internal limiter: one that conflates the two-
stage enquiry, because it does not force the Court to define the right with any 
clarity. 
 
Davis further argues that the reluctance by the courts to interpret sections 26(1) and 
27(1) of the South African Constitution as constituting self-standing guarantee of the 
minimum core of SERs, and their relying heavily on sections 26(2) and 27(2) instead 
is a ploy to cushion the State from having to bear an excessive burden as well as to 
ensure that no direct claim can be made by a litigant against the State for the 
delivery of a minimum core of SERs.172 
 
3.4  Which way for the Kenyan courts – an approach proposed 
 
As has been shown by the SERs limitation jurisprudence from South Africa, there are 
two ways in which domestic courts can deal with limitations in the adjudication of 
SERs. The first being the use purely of the internal limitations, and the second being 
the use of the proportionality test espoused under the general limitations clause. 
The first approach, which has been most frequently adopted in the South African 
context, has been severely criticised as failing to effectively engage with the 
purposes and values protected by the entrenched SERs, failing to engender the 
development of the normative content and scope of the entrenched SERs including 
their interrelationship with other constitutional rights, and providing a less stringent 
standard for the assessment of State action limiting SERs.173 Further, due to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
core was non-derogable and failure could not be justified by reliance on the lack of the 
availability of resources. 
171  Davis 2006 SAJHR 310 note 35. 
172  Davis 2006 SAJHR 311-312. 
173  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 146. She argues at 139-141 that the implications 
of a failure to develop the substantive content of SERs and of concentrating instead on the 
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failure to elaborate a clear normative content of SERs, this approach has conflated 
the traditional two-stage constitutional analysis in rights adjudication into a one-
stage approach where the court analyses only the justifications of the State in 
relation to the internal limitation clauses, with the implication that SERs are both 
defined and limited with reference to the State's available resources.174 The 
conflation of the two-stage constitutional analysis into one also muddles the 
allocation of the burden of persuasion and justification in SER litigation, and may be 
interpreted as requiring the claimants to persuade the courts that the measures 
adopted by the State for the realisation of SERs are unreasonable, a burden which is 
too heavy for claimants to fulfil as the requisite information in that regard is almost 
always with the State.175 It has thus been argued that the failures of this first 
approach detract from the protection offered by the entrenched SERs, with the 
result that the transformative potential of the SERs in the South African Constitution 
have not been achieved.176 
 
The second approach, that of the use of the proportionality test entrenched in the 
general limitation clause, has been adopted chiefly in limitations jurisprudence at the 
international and regional level, as discussed in sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this 
article, and has also been recommended by several prominent authors for use in the 
South African context, as discussed in subsection 3.3. In advocating the adoption of 
an expansive proportionality test in the adjudication of SERs in the South African 
context, Liebenberg argues as follows:177 
                                                                                                                                                        
internal budgetary limitations of SERs is that the entrenched SERs are "both defined and limited 
by reference to the State's available resources". See also Stewart 2010 PSILR 492-495. 
174  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 141, 175-183, 201-202. She argues at 201 that 
this disproportionate reliance on the State's justificatory arguments without the elaboration of 
the content and purpose of the SERs undermines the normative content of the SERs as 
constitutional rights and weakens significantly the jurisprudential framework upon which 
claimants can base their claim for the realisation of the SERs. 
175  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 202-203; Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights 
and Transformative Politics 103, note 79. 
176  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 142,146. In her analysis of reasonableness in the 
Soobramoney judgment, she argues as follows: "It is hard to imagine that legislators, State 
officials and medical personnel would be inspired by the Soobramoney judgment to take [the 
right to health] seriously in their budgeting and policy processes as well as the formulation of 
criteria for rationing access to medical intervention. By failing to engage seriously with health 
care as a human right, the [South African Constitutional Court] missed an opportunity to 
promote the transformative potential of [SERs]." 
177  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 198. 
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[T]he 'exercise in proportionality' in the context of [SERs] claims must be informed 
by a proper analysis of the normative commitments of the relevant rights and the 
impact of the deprivation of the particular resource or service at issue to the 
claimant group. A rigorous analysis of this kind is essential for [SERs] to have 
substantive meaning to those marginalised by poverty. 
 
In her analysis of the Khosa judgment Liebenberg has further indicated that even 
though the South African Constitutional Court has adopted the reasonableness 
approach, which relies chiefly on internal limitations in SER adjudication, the Khosa 
judgment incorporated a proportionality analysis.  
 
Taking the above international, regional and national jurisprudence into account, this 
author thus proposes that the Kenyan courts adopt this second approach, that 
involving the use the proportionality test, in undertaking limitations analysis in SER 
adjudication, so as to enhance the possibilities of the achievement of the 
transformative potential of the Constitution.  In adopting the second approach, it is 
proposed that the Kenyan courts should opt for an adjudication approach which 
entails that the courts engage effectively with the purposes and values of SERs, 
elaborating on their content and scope as well as assessing critically and 
substantively the arguments proffered by the State for the limitation of SERs.178 If 
Kenya adopts this implied minimum core approach, it will follow that a limitations 
analysis which engenders a proportionality test using all the factors provided for in 
article 24(1) of the Constitution will be necessary. The adoption of the minimum core 
approach, and thus a proportionality test taking into account article 24(1) of the 
Constitution in SER adjudication is supported by the requirements of article 24(2)(c) 
of the Constitution, which states as follows: 
 
[A] provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom shall not limit the 
right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential 
content. 
 
                                                 
178  See Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights Adjudication 173, 184, where she affirms that the 
minimum core approach is aimed at giving clear normative content to SERs and thus has the 
advantage of placing a weighty burden of justification on the State in instances of the limitation 
of SERs. For an elaborate discussion of the reasons why Kenya should adopt a minimum core 
approach, see Orago 2013b AHRLJ (forthcoming). 
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Commenting on the importance of this 'core or essential content' requirement in the 
context of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, Woolman argues as follows:179 
 
It tells the Court that no matter how pressing the government's objectives may be, 
there is a point beyond which the government may not go in limiting the rights 
enshrined in the Constitution. It serves this role by shifting the limitation clause 
analysis away from questions about the merit of the restriction's means and 
objectives and back to the detrimental effect the restriction may have on the right 
and the right-holders whose activities are being limited by law. 
 
Taking this into account, it can be argued that the analysis of article 24 should form 
an intrinsic component of limitations analyses by the Kenyan courts in the 
adjudication of the entrenched SERs so as to enhance their protective value. 
 
It serves to question how constitutional adjudication will work in this context. It is 
proposed that in adjudicating matters relating to SERs the courts have to adjust the 
traditional two-stage constitutional analysis and introduce an intermediate stage 
between the traditional right-interpretation analysis and the general limitation 
analysis, where the courts will consider the effects of the internal limitations on the 
right in question.180 Taking this into account, the constitutional limitation analysis will 
thus commence at the first stage where the content of the right is determined and 
an analysis is undertaken of whether the impugned State action or legislation 
infringes on the SER in question. The analysis will then proceed to the intermediate 
stage, where the courts will undertake an analysis of whether the infringement of 
the right is saved by the internal limitation clause, that is, whether the State has 
already put in place sufficient reasonable measures aimed at the progressive 
realisation of the right in question, has prioritised the urgent needs of the most 
vulnerable and marginalised groups in society or whether the State has raised and 
proven the unavailability of resources to immediately realise the rights in question. If 
the State has already put in place sufficient measures aimed at realising the right or 
if it successfully shows that despite its prioritisation of the implementation of rights, 
the resources are inadequate to immediately realise the right in question, then the 
                                                 
179  Woolman 1997 SAJHR 106-107. 
180  See De Vos 1997 SAJHR 93, who acknowledges the need for an expansion of the traditional two-
stage limitations analysis for SERs that contain internal limitations. 
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limitations analysis stops there.181 However, for the immediate obligations that do 
not rely on the progressive realisation standard, such as the negative State duty to 
respect SERs182 and the requirement to realise the minimum essential levels of SERs 
for the vulnerable groups in society, as well as the unqualified SERs, the courts must 
proceed to the third stage of analysis and undertake an article 24 general limitations 
analysis, taking into account the factors enumerated therein.183 By proceeding in this 
way the courts may ensure that the entrenchment of the SERs gives actual rise to 
the hope of enhancing the living standards of the Kenyan people – as key aspiration 
of the Constitution. 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
It is trite that human rights and fundamental freedoms are not absolute, and that 
they can be legitimately limited by the State in appropriate circumstances so as to 
achieve overall societal goals and aspirations. However, for limitations of rights to be 
legitimate they must meet the stringent requirements set out both under 
international law and national constitutional laws.184 In Kenya, in the context of SER 
adjudication, the limitations are contained in internal limitation clauses and the 
general limitation clause in article 24. 
 
This article set out to propose that Kenya adopts a proportionality approach in 
developing its limitation jurisprudence in the context of SER adjudication. The article 
                                                 
181  See Iles 2004 SAJHR 461-462 for a similar proposition. 
182  See Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 35-36, where they argue, taking into account the holding 
of the SACC in the Jaftha case, as follows: "Where the State fails to honour its negative 
obligations under these rights….there is no reason for the court to filter its analysis of section 
26(1) through section 26(2). Consequently, the question of the relationship between section 
26(2) reasonableness and section 36 reasonableness does not arise, and the breach of section 
26(1) may be justified under section 36." For commentaries concurring with this view, see De 
Vos 1997 SAJHR 93-94, who argues that the internal limitations "should therefore never be 
interpreted by the courts as an invitation to water down the negative obligations engendered by 
the rights"; Iles 2004 SAJHR 459-462; Pieterse 2003 SALJ 44-46. 
183  See Pieterse 2003 SALJ 46. 
184  See the 2010 Kenyan Constitution a 19(3)(c) which provides that the fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights "are subject only to the limitations contemplated in this 
Constitution". See also a 2(6) of the Constitution, which incorporates international law in ratified 
treaties into the Kenyan domestic system, and thus requires that a limitation of rights must also 
meet the standards set under international law. 
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found that two approaches can be used in the limitation of SERs, one being the use 
of internal limitation clauses based on the standard of progressive realisation to the 
maximum of available resources, and the other a proportionality approach based on 
a general limitation clause, which requires a stringent scrutiny of a State's 
justifications for the non-realisation of SERs. It was found that an analysis using the 
internal limitation has several weaknesses, such as the lack of elaboration of the 
content of SERs, the failure to sufficiently engage with the values and purposes 
underpinning the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in a constitution, and the 
conflation of the traditional two-stage constitutional analysis, with the result that 
claimants are overburdened in proving the unreasonableness of government 
measures for the realisation of SERs. Due to these and other challenges, the article 
argued for the adoption of the proportionality approach, an approach that has been 
adopted at both the international and regional levels in the adjudication of SERs, and 
which has been affirmed as a better approach in the achievement of the 
transformative potential of transformative constitutions.  
 
The article further submits that should the Kenyan courts adopt the proportionality 
approach of limitations analysis, the traditional two-stage constitutional analysis 
method will have to be adjusted so as to introduce an intermediate stage where the 
effects of the internal limitation on the scope and extent of the State's obligation to 
realise the SER in question are analysed.  
 
In conclusion, and in line with the arguments made in 1962 of former Chief Justice 
Earl Warren of the United States, the courts (also the Kenyan courts) must be 
vigilant in the protection of fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights for all 
persons at all times, and any legislative or executive action limiting the fundamental 
rights of any group of citizens must be given the strictest interpretation possible.185 
                                                 
185  Warren 1962 USAFJAGB 19. 
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